Part 2: Exploring Alternatives: Solutions and Strategies

1. Practical evidence

a) Latest Policies in Singapore

Certainly, these aforementioned systemic trade-offs are not unfamiliar to the Singaporean government, and recent policy changes reflect this. Starting in 2019, all graded assessments ceased at Primary 1 and 2 years (Davie, 2018). Referencing a 2025 curriculum briefing from Punggol View Primary School, it would appear that students are instead evaluated on qualitative descriptors such as learning dispositions and milestones (Punggol View Primary School, 2025). That aside, mid-year examinations were removed for Primary 3 and 5, too. Class positions and level rankings are also omitted from report books. Taken together, these changes reduce educational stresses and nurture the joy of learning by delaying differentiation. While this is a step towards dampening the effects of early tracking, the $2.39 billion increase in tuition expenditure from 2019 to 2024 (Singapore Department of Statistics, 2025) hints at their limitations in shifting paradigms. Because PSLE remains the eventual gatekeeper for access to educational opportunities in secondary schools, these changes are likely taken as additional space for students to outpace one another. 

On the other hand, an achievement level (AL) scoring system is also adopted in place of the traditional T-score system from 2021 onwards (Qing, 2021). This structural redesign effectuates two key changes: 29 possible PSLE scores as opposed to over 200 (Goh, 2021); and with the implementation of subject-based banding (SBB) for the 2024 Secondary 1 cohort and subsequent batches (Ministry of Education, n.d.-b), an option to take subjects at different levels according to their strengths, interests and needs. Once again, these policies on paper can improve educational opportunities by levelling the influence of grades on future choices. However, in practice, secondary schools and academic resources are hierarchically stratified along composite AL scores (Kai, 2021). This nuance implies that even with a wider range of schools to choose from (Ministry of Education, n.d.-a), disadvantaged students are still unable to make competitive choices relative to their peers. 

These policy outcomes illustrate the need for more meaningful structural reforms that advance actionable and equitable pathways in accessing educational opportunities and resources. 

b) Analysis of Best Practices

A brief investigation of how other countries uniquely approach education can offer both perspective and insights for Singapore. For example, Nordic countries subscribe to inclusive differentiation models (Moris Triventi et al., 2016). With the matriculation examination as the sole national examination, high-stakes exams in Finland take place after basic education when students are 16 years old and only as a prerequisite for university admissions (Council for Creative Education, n.d.). These exams are non-mandatory for those furthering their education in vocational institutions. At any rate, early differentiation is informally executed by teachers through qualitative assessments (Finland Education Hub, 2023). The data gathered on each student’s characteristics would then be utilised to guide and adapt classroom experiences (Roiha & Polso, 2021). Finnish teachers, in essence, personalise teaching arrangements, learning environments, teaching methods and support materials for similar-profile students. This bottom-up strategy to differentiation recognises students’ individuality in learning, fosters interest and uplifts disadvantaged students. If remedying educational inequalities is the goal, then beyond sorting purposes, elements of inclusivity should be incorporated into the PSLE system in Singapore. 

2. Alternative policy options

Option 0: Do-nothing

The do-nothing option would allow educational inequality to perpetuate through PSLE and, by implication, socioeconomic influences. Current policies like the AL scoring system and SBB do provide some redress on an institutional level. Nonetheless, on a practical level, the problem of access to inter-school hierarchies being enabled through PSLE is mostly left unaddressed. Given Singapore’s long-serving strategy of developing human capital (SG101, 2024), the choice to do nothing comes with obvious ramifications. 

Option 1: Through-Train System as an Alternative Pathway to Secondary Education

Brought to local attention on multiple occasions by Member of Parliament Denise Phua (2019), the Through-Train system is one where primary and secondary schools are linked on a one-on-one basis, such that students can transition to linked secondary schools without completing any national examinations. This policy sidesteps PSLE by removing it entirely. Naturally, by no means should this be taken as a complete abolishment of the PSLE. Rather, the proposal is to adopt a Through-Train system for a fixed proportion of primary and secondary schools so that alternative pathways are available. Indeed, for Through-Train institutions, the PSLE will be repurposed as non-mandatory tests, like how O-level examinations are for integrated programme (IP) schools (Ministry of Education, 2021). 

Option 2: Adaptive Admissions and Specialisation System 

This policy alternative features a dual approach in moderating the hierarchical nature of secondary school choice that is responsible for equitable challenges in PSLE. The first modification comes in the form of adaptive admission criteria. Essentially, where secondary schools once considered students on account of their added AL scores, they are now categorised and given regulated liberty to decide different weightage for different subjects. With different adaptive standards, students would receive unique AL scores for various subject categories. For example, in contrast with equal weightage in traditional calculations, mathematics could be accorded 40% weightage, with English, mother tongue, and science weighing 20% each. These criteria can be calibrated accordingly to more precisely identify and reward talent, as seen in Figures 1 and 2. After all, interests and talents do not necessarily materialise across the board, and this is a crucial element overlooked by current systems – such redesign ensures that students’ strengths are not diluted by their generalised weakness and masked through crude composite indicators. 

To this end, the next modification would be the categorical specialisation of secondary schools. As mentioned in best practices, differentiation should extend beyond assessment. Ideally, it should be a data point that enables conducive personalisation of learning. From this, secondary schools should capitalise on adaptive admission criteria and heighten expertise in select areas whilst retaining a generalised focus on other subjects. Taking Figure 1 as a reference, schools that weigh mathematics more heavily should attract students with an affinity for mathematics and assign additional funds to further said strength through programmes in applied statistics, modelling, programming, etc. In principle, this policy builds upon the current system, lessening educational inequality by creating an environment where ‘every school is a good school’ (Ang, 2018) by virtue of its specialisation.

	Student A’s Score (Before Adaptive Calculation)	Student A’s Score (After Adaptive Calculation)
Mathematic	AL2	AL2 (40% of overall weightage) = 3.2
English	AL5	AL5 (20% of overall weightage) = 4
Mother Tongue	AL6	AL6 (20% of overall weightage) = 4.8
Science	AL5	AL5 (20% of overall weightage) = 4
Total Score	18	16

	Student A’s Score (Before Adaptive Calculation)	Student A’s Score (After Adaptive Calculation)
Mathematic	AL2	AL2 (55% of overall weightage) = 4.4
English	AL5	AL5 (15% of overall weightage) = 3
Mother Tongue	AL6	AL6 (15% of overall weightage) = 3.6
Science	AL5	AL5 (15% of overall weightage) = 3
Total Score	18	14

3. Policy comparison

a) Effectiveness

Option 1 is highly effective in abating educational inequality from differentiation in PSLE. Introducing guaranteed access to linked secondary schools completely negates early streaming effects, as students will no longer be beholden to their academic performance. Nevertheless, because primary school admission depends on geographical proximity in Singapore, other complicating factors arise and will be discussed in the subsequent section. 

Comparatively, option 2 offers medium effectiveness (Ministry of Education, n.d.-c). This policy confers opportunities for students whose talents are more focused towards certain areas. Conversely, all-rounders who are slower in demonstrating their aptitude are, as before, excluded from high-demand secondary schools. That said, academic merit is intrinsically positional (Domina et. al., 2023); this is perhaps an immutable consequence that cannot be evaded without abolishing PSLE itself, a decision that, too, comes with costs. If these students learn to focus their efforts, however, they might benefit from the variability option 2 provides. Finally, while unlikely because interest begets mastery and vice versa (van Dijk et al., 2020), specialisation in secondary schools might socially side-track students onto specific paths, ironically distorting educational opportunities (Rasmussen & Ydesen, 2020, pp. 31–32). 

b) Equity

While option 1 avoids assessment-based differentiation, it reinforces other forms of differentiation, leading to inequitable outcomes. Among the 185 primary schools in Singapore, 17 of the ‘tier 1 elite schools’ are located in wealthier neighbourhoods (Debs & Cheung, 2021). Theoretically, if these schools are co-opted under the Through-Train system for equitable purposes, then benefits will be based on geographical and socioeconomic differentiation in the long run. Conceivably, wealthier families can always relocate and divest educational opportunities from poorer households. Moreover, option 1 also reduces the secondary school pool size for PSLE participants. Therefore, disproportionate effects will be experienced by late-bloomer students unable to secure spots in Through-Train schools. 

Option 2, contrastingly, is highly equitable. Through specialisation, secondary school choice will be much more meaningful for most students as they become stakeholders in curating their learning. This can apply even to those who underperform in PSLE. Additionally, since school hierarchies are organised into multiple merit-based categories through adaptive criteria, institutional gaps are less pronounced – direct comparisons are harder to draw, and subjective perceptions of inequity will be more muted. Lastly, option 2 above all, uplifts students with more concentrated strengths without affecting or disadvantaging students at the top and bottom of performance.

c) Political Feasibility

Lacking both resources and land, Singapore relies on human capital to maintain global competitiveness (SG101, 2024). In this vein, our educational philosophy has always been to cultivate the best and allow the rest to progress at their own pace (Goh et al., 1979). As Minister for Education, Mr Chan (2024) posits: “We must resist the temptation to ‘teach to the average’”. Indeed, while empowering underachievers contributes to the overarching goal of human capital, it can never be done at the cost of depriving the most capable. Hence, as option 1 has been shown to displace precocious students with underachievers and lead to overall deterioration of academic standards in the Hong Kong context (Poon & Yiu‑Chung, 2008), it is politically unfeasible. Contrarily, option 2 aligns with the political motive of identifying talents in education. 

Criteria	Option 1	Option 2
Effectiveness	High: Directly eliminates educational inequality from PSLE by circumventing it.	Moderate: Creates and directs educational opportunities according to interest and talents, but possesses little benefit for students at either end of academic performance. May socially confine students to educational paths.
Equity	Low: Benefits are skewed towards the wealthy, due to geographical and socioeconomic factors, especially in the long run.	High: Every student benefits from curated learning experiences from specialisation. Subjective perceptions of inequity are also less visible.
Political Feasibility	Low: Sets precedent for abolishing PSLE. Might lead to the deterioration of academic standards too, running contrary to Singapore’s pragmatic philosophy of identifying and developing the best.	High: Complements Singapore’s pragmatic philosophy of identifying and developing the best. Also increases the precision of PSLE as a sorting mechanism.

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